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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 756 
Accident time: 10:14 Accident Date: 07/03/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU 19, Area 4, Taibe Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 19/03/2007 
ID original source: 001/2007 Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M77 submunition Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
grass/grazing area 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 734100:3684648 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate survey (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this incident was made available by the UN MACC in 2008. Its conversion into a 
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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MINE ACTION COORDINATION CENTRE, SOUTHERN LEBANON 
BAC INCIDENT REPORT 001/2007 
Report on Incident that occurred on the 19th Mar 2007 [actually 7th] at CBU 19, at Taibe. 
1. BACKGROUND 
Date: 8 March 2007 [sic] 
Time of Incident: 1000 hrs approx. 
Location: At Taibe, Area 4, Lebanon 
Task: CBU-19, Task Dossier 4-003 
UTM of Task: 734100 – 3684648 
Task Start / Finish Date: 19 Feb 07 / 01 Mar 07 
Organisation Involved: [Demining group]. Unit: BAC Team: 7 
Supervisor: [Name removed] – BAC Team 7 
Reported by: [Name removed] (03-854724) Local (land owner). 
Reported to: [Name removed] (MACC Community Liaison Officer) 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1014hrs approx. 
Organisation POC: [Name removed], Project Manager, [Demining group]  
Investigation Date/Time: 08 March 07, 1245hrs Mar 07  
Investigation Location: Task CBU-19 
Investigation Team: Capt [Name removed] (LAF QA Officer), [Name removed] (MACC Chief 
of QA), [Name removed] (MACC QA Officer). 
ERW Type: US M-77 Submunition  
Accreditation Details: Provincial Accreditation - 28 Oct to 27 Nov 06; Full accreditation: 27 
Nov 06 to 31 Dec 07.  
2. DETAILS OF INCIDENT 
On 07 March 2007, one M-77 Submunition was located by a local shepherd while tending his 
sheep, at Task CBU-19, in an area which had been cleared by [Demining group] using 
surface / visual Battle Area Clearance (BAC) procedures. The shepherd reported the find to 
the land owner [Name removed].  
On 08 March 2007, [Name removed] (MACC CLO) arrived at the task to conduct a QA 
Completion Survey and was informed of the submunition by the land owner. After confirming 
the type and location, he informed [Name removed] (MACC QA Completion Assistant), who 
subsequently informed [Name removed] (MACC Chief of QA). The Completion was 
postponed and the site closed pending the arrival of [Name removed], the [Demining group] 
Project Manager. 
[Demining group] was informed by the MACC SL of the situation and [Name removed] visited 
the site to liaise with [Name removed]. After receiving authorization from the MACC SL Chief 
of QA, [Name removed] immediately organised for BAC Team 7 to sub-surface clear a 50m2 
box around the item for verification purposes. 
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The MACC BOI team arrived at the site, took photographs of the submunition and interviewed 
[Name removed] and [Name removed].  
Evidence 
The ground is flat, comprising compact soil and covered in short vegetation. The M-77 
submunition was surrounded on three sides by light vegetation and positioned on its side with 
approximately two thirds buried. The location of the submunition had been marked by 
[Demining group] with red spray paint (boundary), red sprayed rocks (to one side) and red / 
white danger area marking tape (boundary).  
Interview with [Demining group representative 1] 
[Name removed] informed the MACC SL Investigation team that the area where the M-77 was 
located had been cleared using surface/visual BAC procedures. He said that while working at 
the task, the team had located and destroyed 9 M-77 submunitions and that 10% sub-surface 
sampling had been conducted in the surface cleared areas. He said that no submunitions or 
other ERW had been located within the sampled areas. 
 
 
The large rock marks the location 
 
The M77 submunition 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
On 07 March 2007, a local shepherd discovered an M-77 submunition on an area of land 
which had been cleared by [Demining group] using surface/visual BAC procedures. The 
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information was received by [Name removed] (MACC CLO) the following day on arrival at the 
site for a QA Completion Survey. 
The submunition was positioned on its side, with approximately 2/3 buried, and was 
surrounded by light vegetation. According to [Name removed] (MACC CLO), the shepherd 
had removed some of the vegetation when he discovered it. 
The submunition is considered as missed and should have been located by [Demining group] 
during the BAC operations. 
The incident was Preventable. 
4. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
07 March 2007 
AM: Local shepherd discovered M-77 submunition at CBU-19 and reported it to [Name 
removed] (land owner). 
08 March 2007 (approx.) 
1000hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) arrived at the CBU-19 to conduct a QA Completion 
Survey. He was informed of the incident by [Name removed]. 
1005hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) confirmed the location and type of UXO. 
1014hrs: [Name removed] (MACC CLO) informed [Name removed] (MACC QA Completion 
Assistant). [Name removed] informed [Name removed] (MACC Chief of QA). 
1030hrs: [Name removed] ([Demining group] Project Manager) arrived at CBU-19. 
1100hrs: [Name removed] ([Demining group] BAC Team 7 Supervisor) and Team 7 arrived at 
CBU-19. Clearance commenced around the submunition. 
1145hrs: [Name removed] informed [Name removed] (QA Officer) of the incident. 
1245hrs: MACC SL Investigation team - Capt [Name removed] (LAF QA Officer), [Name 
removed] and [Name removed] arrived at CBU-19 for investigation. 
1330hrs: MACC Investigation Team departed CBU-19. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS 
[Demining group] have completed verification of the immediate area of the incident by 
clearing a 50m2 box around the submunition using sub-surface BAC procedures. No items of 
ERW were located.  
[Demining group] shall conduct 1 day’s refresher training for BAC Team 7 for surface BAC 
procedures prior to commencing operations. 
[Demining group] Project Manager has submitted an amendment to their BAC SOP pertaining 
to visual / instrument assisted surface clearance. This procedure shall take immediate effect 
and the SOP shall be reviewed by the MACC SL. 
[Demining group] shall conduct the Completion Survey and request the MACC SL to conduct 
a QA Completion Survey of CBU-19. 
[Demining group] have submitted a pertinent investigation report. [Not made available.] 
Mine Action Organisations should use instruments to assist when conducting intrusive surface 
BAC, where required. 
6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
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See the following: 
Photographs of incident site. 
Incident report by MACC CLO 02. 
[Demining group] Incident Report (electronic copy to be sent by [Demining group]). [Not made 
available.] 
Report Written By: 
Capt. [Name removed], LAF QA Officer. [Name removed], MACC SL QA Officer, 08 March 
2007 
1. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of QA 
[Name removed], UN Chief QA, MACC SL 
Seen/Agreed  
2. Comments by the MACC SL Chief of Operations 
[Name removed], UN Chief of Operations, MACC SL 
Seen/Agreed  
3. Comments by the MACC SL Programme Manager 
[Name removed], UN Programme Manager, MACC SL 
Seen/Agreed  




The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate Survey because the area had been 
subjected to a surface search when it should have been sub-surface searched. The decision 
to conduct superficial surface search in an agricultural area was the responsibility of the 
MACC SL, the same body that investigated the incident, so no independent investigation was 
made. The secondary cause is listed as a Management control inadequacy because of the 
failings of the Tasking by the SL MACC. 
The visual search of an area is not “clearance” as defined in the IMAS and increases the risk 
of civilian injury because it encourages them to think that the area is safe to use. 
The Inadequate equipment referenced under Notes refers to the lack of a means of searching 
sub-surface (metal-detector). No criticism of the demining group is implied – it was carrying 
out the task as approved by the UN supported MACC. 
It may be interesting to note that a commercial demining group missed a device (for whatever 
reason) and was only required to re-search 50 square metres centred on that device, which 
took less than a day, so may not have been much of an incentive to ensure that no others 
were missed. 
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